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QRAQuantitative risk analysis (QRA) is widely applied in several industries as a tool to improve safety, as part
of design, licensing or operational processes. Nevertheless, there is much less academic research on the
validity and validation of QRA, despite their importance both for the science of risk analysis and with
respect to its practical implication for decision-making and improving system safety. In light of this, this
paper presents a review focusing on the validity and validation of QRA in a safety context. Theoretical,
methodological and empirical contributions in the scientific literature are reviewed, focusing on three
questions. Which theoretical views on validity and validation of QRA can be found? Which features of
QRA are useful to validate a particular QRA, and which frameworks are proposed to this effect? What
kinds of claims are made about QRA, and what evidence is available for QRA being valid for the stated
purposes? A discussion follows the review, focusing on the available evidence for the validity of QRA
and the effectiveness of validation methods.
 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is anopenaccess article under the CCBY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction On a more fundamental level, some authors have raised theRisk analyses are used in many application areas, and many
frameworks, models and specific applications have been presented
in the scientific literature. Quantitative risk analysis (QRA)1 is
included in many textbooks (Aven, 2008; Bedford and Cooke,
2001; Meyer and Reniers, 2013), is considered an important topic
to teach engineering students and health and safety professionals
(Saleh and Pendley, 2012; Wybo and Van Wassenhove, 2016), and
is used in many application areas (Marhavilas et al., 2011). Reviews
of risk analysis methods in specific application areas indicate that
QRA is applied, inter alia, for nuclear installations (Garrick and
Christie, 2002), offshore oil and gas platforms (Vinnem, 1998), mar-
itime transportation in waterways (Li et al., 2012), chemical installa-
tions (Khan et al., 2015) and related land use planning (Pasman and
Reniers, 2014), in the construction industry (Taroun, 2014) and for
cyber security (Cherdantseva et al., 2016).issue about the general lack of attention to validation in risk
research. In an early commentary, Cumming (1981) points out that
quality control procedures for risk analysis methods are not well
developed, while this is an important problem which must be dealt
with. Aven and Heide (2009) and Rosqvist (2010) also note the lim-
ited attention to validity and validation in risk analysis, whereas
Pasman et al. (2009) find that quality criteria for QRA shall be
internationally established. More recently, Rae et al. (2014) formu-
late the issue as follows ‘‘[. . .] the combination of little empirical
study with little natural feedback [. . .] leaves us in almost total
darkness as to the validity and efficacy of QRA”. To the best of
the authors’ knowledge, the only comprehensive review made
regarding risk analysis validation dates from almost three decades
ago, by Suokas and Rouhiainen (1989).
If, as argued by Hansson and Aven (2014), risk analysis is a
discipline in its own right rather than a trans-scientific, interdisci-
plinary practice as interpreted by Weinberg (1981) or a ‘‘scientis-
tic” approach2 as suggested by Reid (2009), there should be
warrants about the scientific validity of QRA. In the understandinges use of
enquiry,
ority of
”.
, http://
Table 1
Journals considered in the literature review.
Journal title Abbr.
Accident Analysis and Prevention AAP
ASCE-ASME Journal of Risk and Uncertainty in Engineering Systems,
Part A: Civil Engineering
AJRUA
ASCE-ASME Journal of Risk and Uncertainty in Engineering Systems,
Part B: Mechanical Engineering
AJRUB
Disaster Prevention and Management DPM
Fire Safety Journal FSJ
Georisk: Assessment and Management of Risk for Engineered
Systems and Geohazards
GR
Human and Ecological Risk Assessment: An International Journal HERA
Injury Prevention IJ
International Journal of Business Continuity and Risk Management IJBCRM
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction IJDDR
International Journal of Disaster Resilience in the Built Environment IJDRBE
International Journal of Reliability, Quality and Safety Engineering IJRQSE
International Journal of Risk Assessment and Management IJRAM
Japanese Journal of Risk Analysis JJRA
Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management JCCM
Journal of Flood Risk Management JFRM
Journal of Hazardous Materials JHM
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries JLPPI
Journal of Occupational Safety and Ergonomics JOSE
Journal of Risk & Reliability: Proceedings of the Institution of
Mechanical Engineers Part O
PIMEPO
Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response JRARC
Journal of Risk Research JRR
Journal of Safety Research JSR
Open Occupational Health and Safety Journal OOHSJ
Process Safety and Environmental Protection PSEP
Process Safety Progress PSP
Reliability Engineering and System Safety RESS
Reliability: Theory & Applications RTA
Risk Analysis RA
Risk and Decision Analysis RDA
Safety Science SS
Stochastic Environmental Research and Risk Assessment SERRA
Structural Safety STS
2 F. Goerlandt et al. / Safety Science xxx (2016) xxx–xxxof foundational issues in risk analysis by Aven and Zio (2014), con-
cepts and principles for establishing validity, and frameworks and
methods for validating risk analysis methods and their results are
important elements for strengthening the scientific foundations of
the discipline. Irrespective of whether or not risk analysis is a
science, considering QRA as an engineering method, the validity of
the method with respect to its purpose, as well as procedures for
establishing this, are important issues, both for system designers
(Rae et al., 2014) and for regulators (Kirchsteiger, 1999). Nonethe-
less, e.g. in important regulatory documents concerning risk analysis,
like the Seveso Directive (Seveso III, 2012), no specific requirements
are stated concerning risk analysis quality control procedures.
In light of the above, the purpose of this paper is to make a
review of the state of the art concerning the validity and validation
of QRA. Focus is on QRA in a safety context, i.e. where QRA is used
in a context of major accidents, engineering design for safety, or
personal safety. More specifically, focus is on contributions in the
scientific literature where validity or validation is considered as a
research topic in itself, or is dealt with as part of a proposed frame-
work for performing quantitative risk analysis. Hence, validation
exercises of specific applications are outside the current scope. This
scope limitation is made for practical reasons because risk analysis
is a very wide research area, and for methodological reasons as it is
important to delineate the scope of work, as found also e.g. by Li
and Hale (2015). Nonetheless, it is noted that work has recently
also been dedicated to validation of security risk models (Zhuang
et al., 2016) and occupational safety risk assessment (Pinto et al.,
2013), showing the relevance of validation in risk analysis as a
topic for research and discussion.
The main questions addressed in this review are as follows:
 Which theoretical views on validity and validation of QRA can
be found?
 Which features of QRA are necessary to distinguish a ‘‘good”
from a ‘‘bad” QRA?
 What frameworks or methods have been proposed to validate a
particular QRA?
 What kinds of claims are made about QRA, and what evidence is
available for QRA being valid for the stated purposes?
A note on terminology is in place, distinguishing two uses of the
term ‘‘validity” and the related term ‘‘validation”. Conceptual valid-
ity is understood here as the condition where an operationalisation
of a concept measures what it intends to measure. This under-
standing is in line with validity e.g. in social sciences, see
Trochim and Donnely (2008), and is applied e.g. by Aven and
Heide (2009) in questioning whether QRA fulfils the scientific cri-
teria of reliability and validity. Pragmatic validity is the condition
where a method meets its intended requirements in terms of the
results obtained, as understood e.g. by Rae et al. (2014) in ques-
tioning the efficacy of QRA. Validation is understood here as the
process by which validity is established, noting that different
authors apply different terminology for this process, e.g. verifica-
tion (Graham, 1995), quality control/qualification (Rosqvist and
Tuominen, 2004; Suokas and Rouhiainen, 1989), credibility assess-
ment (Busby and Hughes, 2006) and evaluation (Goerlandt and
Montewka, 2015).
The review method is first described in Section 2, listing the
materials considered relevant for the purposes of the paper. Subse-
quently, theoretical contributions are outlined in Section 3, and
methodological and empirical contributions addressing different
approaches to validation in Section 4. Section 5 describes a number
of other contributions related to validation of QRA. In Section 6, a
discussion is made, focusing on the effectiveness of the different
approaches to validation and on the evidence for the claims made
about QRA. Section 7 concludes.Please cite this article in press as: Goerlandt, F., et al. Validity and validation of s
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2016.08.0232. Review method
In traditional indexing systems such as Scopus and Web of
Science, risk analysis is not considered as a separate category in
the scientific research areas. Instead, contributions related to risk
are typically listed under ‘‘mathematics”, ‘‘social sciences” or
‘‘engineering”. Hence, general searches in those systems on terms
like ‘‘risk analysis”, ‘‘validation” and ‘‘QRA” results in very many
hits, with low relevance to the above stated aims. Therefore,
another review method has been applied, focusing on specific jour-
nals publishing papers on risk analysis methods, quantitative risk
analysis and the foundations of risk analysis.
To identify these journals, a comparable method was used as in
Reniers and Anthone (2012): an internet search was performed for
journals based on the keywords ‘‘risk”, ‘‘risk analysis”, ‘‘risk assess-
ment”, ‘‘risk management” and ‘‘safety”. In addition, an online jour-
nal ranking tool (SJR, 2016) was used to identify possibly relevant
journals, based on a search for the keywords ‘‘risk” and ‘‘safety” in
the journal title. In addition, a list of the top 35 safety-related jour-
nals in a world-wide ranking reported by Reniers and Anthone
(2012), was considered to contain possibly relevant journals.
Together, these searches resulted in a draft list of journals, of
which, based on a description of the aims and scope on the journal
websites, only journals covering safety-related risk analysis were
retained. A double-check was performed using an analysis by Li
and Hale (2016), ensuring that safety-related journals containing
risk assessment clusters, were included. Table 1 shows the final list
of considered journals.
Subsequently, acknowledging the different terminologies used
in risk research for key concepts, articles were searched in theseafety-related quantitative risk analysis: A review. Safety Sci. (2016), http://
Table 2
Conceptual validity of QRA under different approaches; Aven and Heide (2009).
Approach to QRA Criterion
V1 V2 V3 V4
1 Traditional statistical analysis, large
amount of relevant data available
Y – – Y/N
2 Traditional statistical analysis in other cases N – – Y/N
3 Probability of frequency and Bayesian
approaches estimating non-observable parameters
N Y/N Y/N Y/N
4 Bayesian approaches predicting observables – Y/N Y/N Y
F. Goerlandt et al. / Safety Science xxx (2016) xxx–xxx 3journals based on a combination of two keywords, one related to
‘‘risk” and one related to ‘‘validity/validation”. The first set of key-
words is {‘‘risk analysis”, ‘‘risk assessment”}, the second set {‘‘valid-
ity”, ‘‘validation”, ‘‘verification”, ‘‘credibility”, ‘‘evaluation”,
‘‘qualification”}. The full publication history of these journals was
covered. The resulting sets of papers were manually screened in
light of the review scope and defined research questions, see Sec-
tion 1. This was done based on the title, abstract and full text, if
the latter was readily available and the information in the abstract
provided too little information. Finally, the reference lists of rele-
vant articles were scrutinized, relevant articles identified and
added to the list. Similarly, using Scopus andWeb of Science index-
ing systems, it was traced which articles had cited the identified
relevant articles, and further relevant articles added to the list.
All searches described in this paragraph were executed during
April 2016.
Subsequently, the materials were grouped in three clusters. A
first cluster concerns theoretical contributions, i.e. papers which
focus on issues such as how validation and validity is understood
from a conceptual or foundational point of view. A second cluster
concerns methodological and empirical contributions, addressing
work where specific approaches to validation are proposed and/
or applied. A third cluster contains work where validation is
addressed, without specifically proposing or applying a method.
3. Theoretical contributions
The theoretical contributions related to the validity of QRA are
divided into three categories: conceptual, foundational and prag-
matic. Section 3.1 addresses the conceptual validity, i.e. in how
far QRA succeeds in measuring the concept it intends to describe.
Section 3.2 outlines different views on validation in relation to
different scientific foundations adopted in a risk analysis. Sec-
tion 3.3 focuses on pragmatic validity, outlining different uses sug-
gested for QRA and claims about QRA corresponding to these uses.
In Section 3.4, an overview is given of generic methods to establish
pragmatic validity of a given QRA.
3.1. Conceptual validity
Aven and Heide (2009) question in how far QRA meets the sci-
entific requirements of reliability and validity, adopting an implicit
conceptualization of risk as ‘‘uncertainty about and severity of the
events and consequences of an activity with respect to something
that humans value”, as elaborated in Aven and Renn (2009). They
discuss four approaches to QRA. Traditional statistical analysis,
the probability of frequency approach by Kaplan and Garrick
(1981) and Bayesian approaches estimating non-observable
parameters, e.g. Szwed et al. (2006), focus on an underlying true
risk.3 In contrast, Bayesian approaches predicting observables
(Aven, 2004) do not focus on an underlying true risk. To this purpose,
they define four validity criteria:
V1. The degree to which the produced numbers are accurate
compared to the underlying true risk
V2. The degree to which the assigned subjective probabilities
adequately describe the assessor’s uncertainties of the
unknown quantities considered
V3. The degree to which the epistemic uncertainty assessments
are complete3 The concept of an ‘underlying true risk’ understands risk as a kind of physical
property which can be accurately described and predicted, in line with realist
approaches as described in Section 3.2.
Please cite this article in press as: Goerlandt, F., et al. Validity and validation of s
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tities (fictional quantities or observable events).
The results of the discussion by Aven and Heide (2009) is shown
in Table 2, where it is concluded that under none of the
approaches, QRA in general fulfils the scientific validity require-
ments.4 Under certain conditions, they can be, which to some degree
depends on the adopted risk analysis approach.
3.2. Validity in relation to different scientific foundations
In risk research, different views exists regarding the nature of
the risk concept, the appropriate types of evidence to characterise
risk, and more generally regarding the appropriate scientific foun-
dations for risk analysis. This is known as the realist-constructivist
schism, see e.g. Bradbury (1989), Shrader-Frechette (1991) and
Thompson and Dean (1996). Broadly speaking, risk realists work
under the presumption that risk is a physical property, which
can be characterized by objective facts. They understand the quan-
tities resulting from technical analyses as representations of this
physical property, and see QRA as a tool for estimating the ‘true’
risk. In contrast, risk constructivists reject the idea of risk existing
as a physical property independent of the people assessing it, but
start from the premise that risk is a construct shared by a certain
social group. QRA is understood here as a tool to formalize judg-
ments about risk. Several authors have, sometimes implicitly,
addressed the validation issue from these different viewpoints, as
exemplified below.
Watson (1994) discusses the meaning of the probability in a
QRA, distinguishing multiple interpretations. Two views are partic-
ularly relevant in the context of validation of QRA: the realist inter-
pretation and the subjective interpretation. In the former, a
probability is a measurement of a property of the way the world
is, i.e. a physical property. He reports that nuclear regulators have
a strong intuition of the desirability of a realist interpretation, as
found also by Brown (1993). He also asserts that regulations
requiring demonstration of a probability of a given event not
exceeding a limit value, require a realist interpretation to be mean-
ingful. In the latter, a probability is a measure of an individual per-
son’s degree of belief, in line with e.g. de Finetti (1974).
Consequently, arguing for the subjectivist view of probability,
Watson (1994) understands QRA as an expression of argument,
rather than a tool to reveal a ‘truth’ about risk. More important
than the probabilities per se, is the different types of evidence
underlying the subjective measure of uncertainty, and the argu-
ments given to assign a certain probability. For the problem of val-
idation of QRA, this implies that the focus is on providing4 In Aven and Heide (2009), the four validity criteria are listed as degrees, whereas
in their analysis and discussion, binary answers (yes/no) are applied. It is not entirely
clear how exactly the validity criteria are measured, or what kind of threshold is
applied to translate the degrees from the definitions into binary yes/no categories. In
empirical work where the validity criteria have been applied (Goerlandt and Kujala,
2014), an ordinal categorization is applied derived from statistical measures.
afety-related quantitative risk analysis: A review. Safety Sci. (2016), http://
4 F. Goerlandt et al. / Safety Science xxx (2016) xxx–xxxsubstance to the strength of the argument, rather than a proof that
the calculations accurately represent reality.
In a critique on Gori (1995), who proposes that risk regulation is
restricted to risks which can be objectively defined and verified by
scientific facts, Graham (1995) expresses his support to risk analy-
sis practices based, if necessary, on the basis of intuition, experi-
ence, hunches, guesses and plausible assumptions, as long as the
basis for decision making is clear. Consequently, he states: ‘‘any
determination that a risk has been ‘verified’ is itself a judgment
that is made on the basis of standards of proof that are to some
extent arbitrary, disputable, and subjective”. Also e.g. Apostolakis
(2004) rebuts common criticisms on QRA, such as over-reliance
on the accuracy on the produced numbers, from the perspective
that a strict realist interpretation is untenable.
Rosqvist (2010) addresses validation of QRA in low-probability
high-consequence systems. He asserts: ‘‘the credibility [. . .] of a
risk model is determined by the decision context: if the stakehold-
ers in a decision situation have no objections against the modelling
assumptions, data, expert judgments and inferences made, then
the [. . .] risk analysis can be considered good enough.” The respon-
sibilities and views on validation of typical stakeholders in a risk
analysis project are shown in Table 3. Central to his understanding
is the mental model of each stakeholder, i.e. the ‘‘representation of
the surrounding world, the relationships between its various parts
and person’s intuitive perception about their own acts and their
consequences”. Taking a constructivist foundation, he rejects the
idea of a true underlying risk. He relates validation of a QRA to a
reinterpretation of the conceptual validity criteria V2, V3 and V4
of Aven and Heide (2009). If the expert is able to transform the per-
ceived uncertainties related to a quantity into a probability mea-
sure (V2), if all unknown quantities taken into account in the risk
model (V3), and if the right quantities are addressed in order to
apply the adopted risk criteria (V4), then the QRA is valid as a tool
to support decision making.
Goerlandt (2015) discusses the implications of adopting realist
or constructivist scientific foundations for the validation of risk
analysis. For risk realists, validation amounts to attempts to con-
firm that the estimates are close to the ‘true’ value. The focus then
becomes a confrontation of the model output with empirical ‘facts’.
For risk constructivists, validation focuses on justifying the choices
made in producing statements about risk, which is a semi-formal,
conversational and argumentative process.
Finally, it is worth noting that the analysis of conceptual valid-
ity of QRA by Aven and Heide (2009) implicitly also makes use of
the realist-constructivist distinction. In approaches 1–3 of Table 2,
the focus is on an underlying true risk as in realist scientific foun-Table 3
Stakeholders in a risk analysis project: responsibilities and views on validation;
Rosqvist (2010).
Stakeholder Responsibility Validation issues of particular
interest
Decision
maker
Liability related to the risk
decision
Are the inferences relevant for
the used risk criteria related to
the system under study?
Risk analyst Risk model development and
interpretation of the results
under the assumptions and
limitations coupled to the risk
model
Are proper data, experts,
methods and tools used such
that uncertainties have been
addressed and resolved as far
as possible within the project?
Domain
expert
Provides knowledge related to
the phenomena under study,
especially quantitative expert
judgments on system model
parameters
Is all background knowledge
available in order for me to
given an informed
assessment?
Please cite this article in press as: Goerlandt, F., et al. Validity and validation of s
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‘true’ risk as in constructivist scientific foundations.3.3. Pragmatic validity: claims made about QRA
A central concern in regarding the pragmatic validity of QRA is
intended use of the analysis. A regular criticism to QRA is an uncrit-
ical, mechanistic application of its results in a decision context and
over-reliance on the produced numbers (Apostolakis, 2004;
Crawford, 2001; Hagmann, 2012). However, several other uses
have been proposed for QRA models and their results. As the
requirements for pragmatic validity of a QRA depend on the
intended use (Suokas and Rouhiainen, 1989), methods for estab-
lishing validity need to be clear which use(s) the analysis is being
validated for. It is instrumental to define generic claims made
about QRA as a basis of evaluating the evidence for or against
QRA being fit for the stated purpose. Rae et al. (2014, 2012) differ-
entiate three such claims.
The accuracy claim implies that the aggregate estimate of total
system risk is sufficiently accurate and precise to allow correct
decision making, which is needed e.g. for classifying risk, selecting
between competing designs, or comparing risk with pre-defined
risk targets (acceptability criteria) (Rae et al., 2014). In such uses,
QRA models are artefacts producing accurate and encompassing
answers to the classical questions: ‘‘What can happen? How likely
is it? What are the consequences?” (Haimes, 2009; Kaplan, 1997).
The cost-effective usefulness claim means that performing QRA
provides a safety benefit, which is measurably better than provided
by methods not relying on quantification. Such usefulness is
required e.g. for identifying ways to improve a design, trading-off
risk against other concerns, or for tracking changes in risk over
time (Rae et al., 2014). Here, QRA models are used to summarize
evidence from different sources, facilitate communication between
stakeholders, provide a platform for reflection and discussion,
highlight areas of uncertainty where more information or research
is necessary, or to complement operational experience. Such uses
for QRA are suggested e.g. by Suokas (1988), Apostolakis (2004)
and Marks (2007).
The usefulness claim is a fall-back claim, where QRA provides a
benefit, but no more than other methods not relying on quantifica-
tion. In other words, this claim means that the application of QRA
helps designers to make safer systems and/or decision makers to
make better decisions, but QRA cannot be shown to be more
cost-effective than other methods (e.g. qualitative methods, safety
engineering methods or behavioural safety approaches). As it is
known that QRA studies are typically rather resource-intensive,
the mere usefulness claim is a quite poor justification to the prac-
tice of using QRA: usefulness without cost-effectiveness may
reduce the overall effectiveness of a safety programme, as scarce
resources could potentially be allocated to more effective safety
building strategies (Rae et al., 2014).
Suokas and Rouhiainen (1989) present three basic questions for
the pragmatic validity of a QRA:
 How well has the analysis identified hazards and their
contributors?
 How well are the results achieved relative to the resources
used?
 How accurately has the analysis estimated the risks of the
system?
These questions are well in line with the three claims about
QRA suggested by Rae et al. (2014), matching respectively the use-
fulness claim, the cost-effective usefulness claim and the accuracy
claim. This confirms that these claims are appropriate as a basisafety-related quantitative risk analysis: A review. Safety Sci. (2016), http://
F. Goerlandt et al. / Safety Science xxx (2016) xxx–xxx 5to scientifically establish how effective QRA is in relation to its pos-
sible uses.3.4. Classification of approaches for establishing pragmatic validity
Suokas (1985) suggests following approaches for establishing
pragmatic validity of a risk analysis:
1. Complete Benchmark exercise: comparison with a complete
parallel analysis of the same system or activity
2. Partial benchmark exercise: comparison with a parallel analy-
sis on some parts of the same system or activity
3. Reality check: comparison with operating experience of corre-
sponding systems
4. Independent peer review: examination of the output of the
risk analysis by a (range of) technical expert(s)
5. Quality assurance: examination of the process behind the
analysis.
These methods can be used irrespective of the intended use of
the QRA and the corresponding claims of accuracy, cost-effective
usefulness or usefulness as suggested by Rae et al. (2014) and
Suokas and Rouhiainen (1989), see Section 3.3.
The first two approaches, full and partial benchmark exercises,
are primarily intended for evaluating the coverage of an analysis
method, the reliability of the results in terms of analysis content
and outcome, for highlighting uncertainties in the model and for
identifying practices for dealing with the uncertainties. They are
usually a part of the development and general acceptance process
of a method, but are too expensive as an approach to assess the
pragmatic validity of a particular QRA.
The third approach, a reality check, concerns the validity of a
generic analysis method (e.g. how well it identifies hazards and
their contributors), and can be applied to validate the results of a
specific QRA. Comparisons with accidents and disturbances can
provide the necessary insights. In several countries, accident data-
bases have been established for this or other purposes, but the
quality of accident descriptions has been (Suokas and
Rouhiainen, 1989), and remains (Grabowski et al., 2009;
Psaraftis, 2012) a problem. Reflections on occurred incidents in
comparison with the risk analysis can provide insights whether
they belong to accepted risks, whether they represent unwarranted
assumptions made in the analysis, whether they belong to issues
left outside the scope or whether they should have been covered
but have remained unidentified.
The fourth approach, an independent peer review, builds on
personal experience of individuals having technical expertise on
the considered phenomena, practitioners, or experts in QRA. This
can be applied to a specific QRA, facilitated by summary docu-
ments and presentations.
The fifth approach, quality assurance of QRA, is rooted in the
similarity between a risk analysis and a production system, having
its own information and management systems. It is similar to inde-
pendent peer review, but focus is more on the adequacy of the pro-
cesses behind the production of a QRA. A key assumption is that
there is a strong relation between the quality of the underlying
processes and the quality of the QRA. Hence, the pragmatic validity
of a QRA is established by assessing the quality of planning, orga-
nization and execution of the analysis, as well as the quality of the
analysis itself.4. Methodological and empirical contributions
In this Section, contributions proposing methods to validate a
QRA and empirical studies on the validity of QRA are reviewed.Please cite this article in press as: Goerlandt, F., et al. Validity and validation of s
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4.1. Benchmark exercises
Amendola et al. (1992) report on a benchmark exercise, where a
reference ammonia storage facility was analysed by 11 teams rep-
resenting control authorities, research organizations, engineering
companies and industries. A complete risk analysis was performed
and the results were compared with respect to methodologies,
data and models employed. The results varied widely, both from
one another, and when compared to available historic data. The
numerical output showed a typical spread of 1–2 orders of magni-
tude, with deviations of up to 4 orders of magnitude not uncom-
mon. Comparison of the results proved difficult, due in part to
the lacking harmonization of content and presentation of results.
Nonetheless, several sources of uncertainty and variability
between the methods were identified, which were regarded as a
starting point for establishing a consensus procedure for chemical
QRA.
Lauridsen et al. (2002, 2001) report a QRA benchmark exercise
concerning an ammonia storage facility, with seven different teams
executing an independent analysis. The results were compared in
terms of outcome, methodologies, data and models. Large discrep-
ancies were found between the teams for the total risk, of two to
three orders of magnitude. The ranking of the scenarios also dif-
fered substantially between analysis teams, especially for those
scenarios characterized by less severe consequences. The main sig-
nificance of the work was the identification of uncertainties con-
cerning assumptions, methods and data in the different methods.
Ham et al. (2011) report on an extensive benchmark exercise on
a virtual hydrogen refuelling station. Nine independent teams exe-
cuted a QRA on a defined test case, each according to their own
approach and practice, including identification of scenarios, proba-
bility analysis, consequence analysis and risk estimation. A set of
requested output was defined, and some input values were sug-
gested for the test case. As large differences were expected from
earlier benchmark exercises, no attempt was made to be exhaus-
tive in the considered scenarios or to obtain an ‘accurate’ total risk
number. Rather, the aim was to identify differences in methodolo-
gies, assumptions made and knowledge gaps.
The results of this exercise indicate significant differences
between the modelling approaches, the underlying assumptions
and the outcomes. However, a comprehensive comparison
between the approaches was not achieved in this study. According
to the authors, this is due to not all partners being able to provide
the results in the requested format, but also due to the multitude of
different underlying models, assumptions and parameters. Com-
parison of data pairs could be useful to understand the reasons
for the differences, but this has not been extensively pursued. In
a second phase of the benchmark exercise, focus was on the conse-
quences as calculated for selected scenarios, which allowed more
meaningful insights in the reasons behind the differences.
Goerlandt and Kujala (2014) performed a comparative analysis
of three models for assessing the risk of ship-ship collision, focus-
ing on the probability of the accident. Two quantitative models and
one qualitative method were applied to a case study of vessel traf-
fic in a selected area of the Gulf of Finland. The study was framed in
a context of three scientific reliability criteria proposed by Aven
and Heide (2009):
R1. The degree to which the risk analysis methods produce the
same results at reruns of these methods
R2. The degree to which the risk analysis produces identical
results when conducted by different analysis teams, but using
the same methods and dataafety-related quantitative risk analysis: A review. Safety Sci. (2016), http://
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results when conducted by different analysis teams with the
same scope and objective, but no restrictions on methods and
data.
Criterion R1 was met to a high degree for all considered meth-
ods. However, based on a systematic analysis of key parameters in
the models, criterion R2 showed variations over an order of magni-
tude in the results, leading to a low to medium reliability. R3 reli-
ability is low, with variations up to two orders of magnitude not
uncommon. Significantly, the methods did not consistently rank
the sea areas with highest risk, implying that different methods
point to very different areas of highest accident risk.Table 4
Levels of independent review of QRA, Garrick (1982).
QRA topic Type of review Comment
Objective and
statement of
purpose
High level Must put the whole study and scope of
review in perspective
Project plan and
scope of work
High level Must put the whole study and scope of
review in perspective
Figures of merit High level Important distinctions between core
melt, source term, and health effects
must be clear
Methodology High level,
technical
specialists
Attention should be given to areas such
as treatment of uncertainty, plant
recovery, dependent phenomena, and
human error
Data base High level,
technical
specialists
Special attention should be given to the
different types of data involved and the
process of going from generic to plant-
specific use
Results High level,
technical
specialists
Emphasis should be on major
contributors, state of the art, and
surprises and differences from other
QRAs
Implementation
and
application
Technical
specialists
practitioners
This review should consist of detailed
verification of key analyses leading to
dominant contributors under the
direction of the high-level review
Verification of
selected
results
Practitioners This should be done under the direction
and guidance of the high-level review4.2. Reality checks
Suokas (1988) performed a comparison of the results of four
hazard identification methods, the backbone of QRA, with accident
descriptions. The methods included hazard and operability study
(HAZOP), action error analysis (AEA), failure mode and effect anal-
ysis (FMEA) and management oversight and risk tree (MORT). The
aim was to evaluate which of the contributors would have been
identified by each of the methods. Information on accidents was
collected from seven process plants by interviewing process oper-
ators and their foremen. The evaluation of the methods revealed
that together, the methods identified 55% of the contributors found
in accident descriptions, with HAZOP most successful (36%) and
MORT least successful (6%). Especially contributors from the tech-
nical subsystem were identified, with the methods less able to
address the human and information and management subsystems.
This showed the inherent limitations of QRA for large systems. It
was concluded inter alia that QRA should complement and make
best use of operational experience, that several methods should
be applied in hazard identification to complement each other, that
better tools were needed to address human and organizational fac-
tors. This is in line with recent research on knowledge manage-
ment to identify atypical scenarios as a means to improve risk
analysis practices by making better use of past experience and
available information, see e.g. Paltrinieri et al. (2012).
Rouhiainen (1993) evaluated several risk analyses from the per-
spective of operational experience, in particular critical incidents,
collected from the systems analysed. While not all analyses
involved QRA, the completeness of the hazard identification tech-
niques in comparison to the occurred incidents also is meaningful
in a QRA context, to assess the completeness of scenarios consid-
ered. Two studies are particularly relevant. In a first study, three
methods were applied to a pulp manufacturing process: the poten-
tial problem analysis (PPA), hazard and operability study (HAZOP)
and action error analysis (AEA). A comparison with 397 incidents
collected from production reports about the system revealed that
the possibility of 73 of these were not identified by the analysis
methods. In a second study, 51 incidents were collected from a liq-
uid chlorine handling subsystem of a chlorine plant. Comparison
with identified hazards based on PPA and HAZOP revealed that
12 were not identified based on the analysis. In both studies, sev-
eral serious incidents were not identified. It was also found that for
the considered studies, operational experience is of limited use for
numerical comparisons with the analysis results.
Sornette et al. (2013) perform an evaluation of the risk as calcu-
lated in a QRA for a nuclear plant, compared with accidents and
incidents in a (non-standard) database compiled by Sovacool
(2008). They find that QRA is not adequate to reflect the true risks
involved in the nuclear industry, in particular in regards the prob-
ability of large catastrophes.Please cite this article in press as: Goerlandt, F., et al. Validity and validation of s
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2016.08.0234.3. Independent peer review
Garrick (1982) proposed a method for peer review in the
nuclear industry. The review is facilitated by summary documents
and presentations, with an emphasis on key results, major contrib-
utors to risk and the basic thought processes involved. The people
conducting the review should be recognized technical experts,
with experience in assessing complex system risk. In some cases,
the high-level review may need to be supplemented with detailed
technical reviews on issues raised in the high-level review. The
levels of review are outlined in Table 4.
The United States National Research Council (NRC, 1998)
described a set of criteria that are useful for peer review of any risk
analysis study, see also Ahearne (1999). These are summarized in
Table 5.
Rosqvist and Tuominen (2004) outline an exploratory peer
review process for use in context of a Formal Safety Assessment
(FSA), a quantitative risk-cost benefit procedure to support inter-
national maritime regulatory decision making (IMO, 2002). Several
methodological validation criteria are proposed. Table 6 outlines
those relevant for the risk analysis phase.
Psaraftis (2012) reports on the review criteria applied by the
FSA Expert Group, based on MSC 86/26. These are:
1. consider whether the methodology was applied in accordance
with the FSA guidelines and the guidance on the use of Human
Element Analysing Process (HEAP) and FSA;
2. check the reasonableness of the assumptions and whether the
scenarios adequately addressed the issues involved;
3. check the validity of the input data and its transparency (e.g.
historical data, comprehensiveness, availability of data, etc.);
4. check whether risk control options and their interdependence
were properly evaluated and supported by the assessment;
5. check whether uncertainty and sensitivity issues have been
properly addressed;
6. check whether the scope of the assessment was met;
7. check whether expertise of participants was sufficient for the
range of subjects under consideration.afety-related quantitative risk analysis: A review. Safety Sci. (2016), http://
Table 5
Criteria for risk analysis validation, NRC (1998).
Criterion Explanation
Constraints Is there a clear statement of the constraints placed on
the contractor and a clear statement of the impacts of
these constraints?
Data collection Are the data collection procedures clearly explained
and are they based on established methods?
Key factors Are all key factors included in the analyses?
Is a credible explanation given for any that are not?
Assumptions Are all assumptions identified and explained?
Can the effects of these assumptions be traced
through the analyses?
Methodologies Are the analytic tools based on established
procedures, or, if not, are they clearly explained and
supported?
Transparency Can the logic be followed readily?
Is the influence of specific inputs and approaches,
such as simulations, identified?
Are the data and analyses handled competently?
Sensitivity Were sensitivity analyses done regarding key
assumptions and uncertainties?
Results Do the results follow from the methods, the data
presented, and the assumptions?
Conclusions and
recommendations
Are the conclusions and recommendations consistent
with the study results?
Are the conclusions consistent with the results of the
sensitivity analyses?
Are the conclusions and recommendations
adequately supported by evidence, analyses, and
arguments?
F. Goerlandt et al. / Safety Science xxx (2016) xxx–xxx 7Montewka et al. (2014) propose a Bayesian QRA modelling
framework, including three computational methods to support
model validation in an expert review. A one-way sensitivity analy-
sis identifies the essential variables having the highest impact on
the model outcome. A value-of-information analysis identifies
the most informative variables with respect to the output variable,
in terms of the concentration of the output’s probability mass,
detected using the entropy concept. An influence analysis quanti-
fies the effect of changes in assumptions on the model outcome.
The above expert review methods focus on the resulting proba-
bilities from the risk models, typically in a context of comparison
with pre-defined risk acceptance criteria (Psaraftis, 2012;
Rosqvist and Tuominen, 2004). Goerlandt (2015), extending work
by Goerlandt and Montewka (2015), proposes a two-stage Baye-
sian QRA framework, where the risk model is used primarily as a
tool for argumentation and as a basis for reflection, as suggested
by NRC (1996) and taking a contemplative attitude to the evidence
base as suggested by Marks (2007). Building on ideas about con-
ceptual validity from social sciences (Trochim and Donnely,
2008) and risk research (Aven and Heide, 2009) and applying
methods for model validation (Forrester and Senge, 1980;
Pitchforth and Mengersen, 2013), a framework for assisting expert
reviewers in the risk model validation is proposed, see Fig. 1. The
focus of the framework is the practical use of the model, which is
argumentatively approached through assessing the appropriate-Table 6
Criteria for risk analysis validation, Rosqvist and Tuominen (2004).
FSA step Criteria
Scope and objectives Stakeholders are informed about adopted decision rules and
Hazard identification Stakeholders’ and domain experts’ feedback on the complete
by the peer group
Risk assessment Model uncertainty and bias of risk model is addressed by do
Completeness uncertainty of risk model is addressed by dom
Risk control options Stakeholders’ and domain experts’ feedback on the complete
peer group
Please cite this article in press as: Goerlandt, F., et al. Validity and validation of s
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2016.08.023ness of the model structure, content, discretization, parameteriza-
tion and behaviour. For each of these model aspects, a series of
questions is proposed, guiding the experts in their assessment of
the model’s usefulness. Value-related validity is approached by
highlighting uncertainties and biases in the model construction,
and procedural validity focuses on issues such as the appropriate-
ness of expert elicitation procedures and transparency. The
method is applied formatively, i.e. it does not lead to a gradation
of the QRA with regards to its quality, but is only used to facilitate
a discussion among reviewers, who make an informed decision
about the QRA’s fitness for use.4.4. Quality assurance
Suokas and Rouhiainen (1989) introduced the concept of qual-
ity control in the validation of risk analysis. They also briefly out-
lined a checklist-based method for assessing the quality of a risk
analysis, which progresses in accordance with the idealised phases
of a risk analysis, see Fig. 2. This method is more elaborately
described by Rouhiainen (1992, 1990) and Tuominen and
Rouhiainen (1996). The assessment is based on the documentation
of the analysis, which should therefore be detailed enough. As the
expectations for the risk analysis depend from one activity to
another, the method is intended to be flexible in order to deal with
the range of requirements and expectations. The decision whether
all aspects of the analysis have been taken into account adequately,
and whether these have been executed appropriately, is left for the
assessor to make. For instance, no specific methods which can or
should be applied are suggested; it is assumed the assessor has
the required knowledge of applicable methods and criteria for
making a selection. Another example concerns the significance of
the observed deficiencies. Similarly, the effect of missing or defec-
tive factors on the estimation of accident probability and conse-
quence, should be evaluated. However, the method does not
include any ranking on the importance of the aspects, and it is left
to the assessor to make an informed judgment.
Pitblado (1994) describes the quality assurance approach
adopted in a given consultancy organization for QRA of onshore
and offshore facilities. Referring to generic national and interna-
tional standards, including the ISO 9000, the approach taken to
ensure quality is described. A central issue concerns feedback from
clients concerning the services rendered, i.e. feedback of the QRAs
as experienced by the users. One important issue here is that QRAs
are often perceived to focus excessively on the technical issues of
the analysis, and too little on identifying the user needs, framing
and communication. A more balanced approach is required, as
illustrated in Fig. 3.
A balance in the activities related to a QRA study are achieved
through quality control processes similar as in ISO 9000. The tech-
nical quality system is built up as a hierarchy of documents, which
is a basis for ensuring consistency between QRA analyses in differ-
ent company business units and groups. The consultancy policy is a
short document addressing issues as the company philosophy,Quality
characteristics
criteria, verified by the peer group Transparency
ness of hazard identification process is recorded and verified Completeness
main experts and verified by the peer group Credibility
ain experts and verified by the peer group Completeness
ness of risk control option are recorded and verified by the Completeness
afety-related quantitative risk analysis: A review. Safety Sci. (2016), http://
Fig. 1. Outline of QRA validation framework, Goerlandt (2015).
Fig. 2. Main aspects of a risk analysis covered by the quality assessment method, based on Tuominen and Rouhiainen (1996).
8 F. Goerlandt et al. / Safety Science xxx (2016) xxx–xxxclient needs, work methods and company culture. Guidelines
address methods and strategies for carrying out different types of
studies, whereas technical notes define detailed instructions for
using individual QRA tools (models, data, and parameters). Finally,
a procedure for deviations establishes how to proceed in cases a
particular project wishes to deviate from the guidelines and tech-
nical notes, e.g. to account for new technologies or particular
sources of uncertainty.
Vergison (1996) presented a quality assurance based technique
for evaluating the validity of models for calculating the conse-
quences of major hazards in QRA studies. A questionnaire was
developed to cover a range of issues relevant to model validation,Please cite this article in press as: Goerlandt, F., et al. Validity and validation of s
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2016.08.023particularly aiming to bridge the gap between scientific advances
and industrial application. The questionnaire is based on five con-
cepts: scientific quality assurance, algorithmic quality assurance,
computerization quality assurance, man-machine interface quality
assurance and model validation and sensitivity analysis.
Rae et al. (2014) approach quality of QRA through a comprehen-
sive classification of possible flaws in an analysis, from which a
maturity model is derived to assess the quality of a QRA. The matu-
rity model is based on a process model for a typical risk analysis,
established based on a set of standards and manuals for risk anal-
ysis. These processes include: (i) provision of resources, (ii) estab-
lishment of context, (iii) identification of dangerous outcomes,afety-related quantitative risk analysis: A review. Safety Sci. (2016), http://
Fig. 3. Quality through a balanced approach to QRA, based on Pitblado (1994).
F. Goerlandt et al. / Safety Science xxx (2016) xxx–xxx 9(iv) building models, (v) risk estimation, (vi) risk evaluation, (vii)
planning actions, and (viii) communication of results. For each step
of the process, an analysis was made of the possible flaws, based on
concerns raised in the scientific literature, published peer reviews
of risk analyses, and the developers’ personal experience. These
flaws were then assigned a level of the maturity model based on
an assessment of their potential for undermining a risk analysis.
Four practically achievable levels are defined, with flaw categories
as defined in Table 7. The maturity model is a method for review-
ing a QRA, where a higher level of maturity corresponds to a better
risk analysis. At Level One, the QRA is not fit to use, mainly due to
problems with documentation and presentation: as it is impossible
to reconstruct how the analysis was performed, possible other
flaws cannot be uncovered. At Level Two, the QRA is invalid in
the sense that the flaws in the analysis greatly outweighs the
underlying uncertainty being investigated. This concerns primarily
substantive process failures. At Level Three, the QRA is valid but
inaccurate: the analysis has several flaws which may distort the
results, but likely do not dominate the underlying uncertainty
being investigated. At Level Four, the QRA is accurate but chal-
lengeable: there can be disagreement about certain features ofTable 7
Maturity model for QRA quality assurance and review, Rae et al. (2014).
Maturity level Flaw category
Level One: Unrepeatable Failure to describe source material
Failure to describe scope and objectives
Failure to report methods
Failure to report results
Level Two: Invalid Major problems with source data
Major omissions in the analysis which were not
explicitly excluded by the scope
Mismatch between the risk analysis and reality
Major inaccuracies in the analysis
Internal inconsistency
Incorrect evaluation
Misleading conclusions
Failure to report limitations
Systematic problems with the conduct of the
analysis
Level Three: Valid but
inaccurate
Insufficient rigour in selecting source data
Incorrect processing of data
Insufficient characterisation of uncertainty
Shortfalls in conclusions and recommendations
Level Four: Accurate but
challengeable
Disputed data sources
Insufficient scientific knowledge
Please cite this article in press as: Goerlandt, F., et al. Validity and validation of s
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entific knowledge.
The model can also act as a guide for research, e.g. by prioritiz-
ing empirical studies first on lower maturity levels, regarding
which processes/techniques/social structures reduce errors,
increase quality, or make practitioners more critically aware of
the position of their work on the maturity scale.5. Other contributions related to QRA validity
A few other authors have addressed the validation of QRA, while
not as such proposing a method for establishing pragmatic validity
or performing empirical analyses according to one of the categories
proposed by Suokas (1985), see Section 3.4. These are briefly out-
lined next.
Vasseur and Llory (1999) describe a synthesis of the results of
an international survey to get advice from a number of interna-
tional QRA experts and practitioners regarding, among other, the
scientific and technical monitoring program in their organization,
which includes the validation process to be implemented. As many
issues are covered, from the viewpoint of individual experts, for a
coherent summary of the findings, the reader is referred to the
original publication. Overall, following issues are addressed: (i)
QRAs and scientific validation, (ii) limit, restrictions and difficulties
with QRA models, (iii) quality criteria for QRA models, (iv) indirect
validation of QRA, (v) validation of the results obtained with QRA
models, including assessment of assumptions, sensitivities and
uncertainties, and (vi) the validation of the uses made of the QRA
results.
Busby and Hughes (2006) discussed the validation of QRA from
a normative perspective. Through interviews with experts from
industry, regulators and academia, views were gathered on what
the limits of QRA are in general, of the methodology, of the people
using it, and of the context in which it is used. These limitations
were subsequently developed into norms, i.e. requirements or con-
ventions about how to best perform and apply QRA given its limi-
tations. Some examples of such expert-defined norms are shown in
Table 8. It was hypothesised that some of the norm categories
could be further developed into a taxonomy, but this was not fur-
ther developed.
Instead, a general discussion was given onto how build a frame-
work in which to apply the norms. A central issue is the need for
contextual sensitivity into the process of applying the norms:
norms should be selected which are generally important, impor-
tant in the considered context, likely to be infringed and represent-
ing issues where progress can be made. Furthermore, the normsafety-related quantitative risk analysis: A review. Safety Sci. (2016), http://
Table 8
Example categories of norms for validating QRA, abridged from Busby and Hughes
(2006).
Norm category Explanation Example norm
Complete Incorporating all
important elements and
concerns
Ensure violations are not omitted
because they are controversial or
unquantifiable
Knowledgeable Drawing full on the
knowledge available
Do not rely on risk assessors who
work in supplier organizations
that are insulated from failure
knowledge
Grounded Grounded in appropriate
data and judgment
Avoid using statistical data that is
not differentiated by conditions
that are major causes of failure
Integrated Pulling together the
parts into an effective
whole
Ensure risk assessment integrates
knowledge that is fragmented
across many parties
Systemic Dealing with
interactions and systems
as a whole
Analyse systemic qualities like
complexity and coupling rather
than predict detailed event
sequences
Guiding Helping people using the
assessment to use it
effectively
Show how risk assessment
processes raise awareness and
test assumptions rather than
providing a definite outcome
Open Being open about
problems and humble
about achievements
Acknowledge the likely absence
of data on causes that have only
recently emerged as causes
Consultative Involving stakeholders
and taking account of
concerns
Draw widely on working-level,
supposedly non-authoritative
sources of knowledge
Timely Producing results soon
enough to be acted upon
Conduct assessments early
enough to influence design
decisions that are costly to
reverse
Accessible Understandable to
people with a stake
Provide easy ways to navigate
from conclusions to analysis and
assumptions
Facilitative Providing a helpful basis
for dealing with risks
Test for a culture of willingness in
the organization in question to
act on risk analyses
10 F. Goerlandt et al. / Safety Science xxx (2016) xxx–xxxshould be applied formatively, not summatively. That is, it should
help people reason about a risk analysis, and perhaps improve it,
rather than simply to declare it of a certain, quantitative standard.
Possible uses for such a framework are demonstration, testing, dia-
logue and specification. Attention was also given to possible nega-
tive effects of a validation framework: if used inappropriately, it
can be turned into a device to create a sense of credibility for the
analysis, without strong foundations. However, if used as part of
a conversational and transparent process, it can assist users of risk
analyses to highlight the issues relevant to them, leading to a sense
of trust in the analysis.
van Xanten et al. (2013) discusses the QRA practices in the
chemical industry in the Netherlands, where a legally prescribed
calculation method should be used to limit the variability of risk
analyses. A case study is performed, to assess the appropriateness
of this calculation model and to act as a basis for discussion regard-
ing regulatory reform in the Dutch QRA practice. The evaluation
focuses on two aspects of chemical QRA: (1) the calculation of indi-
vidual and societal risk for land-use planning, and (2) the provision
of insight into measures which may increase safety in the specific
situation. No reference is made to a specific review method.
Instead, five ad-hoc criteria are applied: transparency, verifiability,
robustness, correctness and safety relevance. Based on the analysis,
several recommendations are made to improve the Dutch use of
QRA in decision making, including increased dialogue with stake-
holders, increased attention to uncertainty, and improvements in
presentation of the analysis results. These recommendations may
also be of use e.g. for possible revisions of the Seveso Directive
(Seveso III, 2012), as these currently include, as mentioned earlier,Please cite this article in press as: Goerlandt, F., et al. Validity and validation of s
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2016.08.023no guidance or requirements regarding quality assurance or
validation.6. Discussion
6.1. Evidence for the effectiveness of validation methods
An important aspect of the validation methods is their own
validity. In other words: what evidence is available that these
methods perform well for their purpose of validating a QRA? This
is a significant question, as e.g. Busby and Hughes (2006) argue
that there is a danger that with increased layers of formalisation
we become less, rather than more, able to develop our judgment
about what is good and bad in a risk analysis. Procedural
approaches may be helpful, but inadequate or irrelevant proce-
dures may exacerbate the problem rather than alleviate it. Given
the relatively little attention to validity and validation, it is unsur-
prising that even less research on the validity of validation meth-
ods has been performed. No work was found addressing the
effectiveness of benchmark exercises or reality checks.
Fabbri and Contini (2009) report on a benchmark exercise to
evaluate how independent peer reviews of the same risk study
could differ from one another. The focus is thus on the process of
reviewing a risk analysis, questioning also how the differences
may affect the finally adopted risk estimates. As a reference instal-
lation, as a tank wagon unloading station handling sulphur dioxide
and a storage facility for ethanol was defined. A single tool for area
risk analysis was applied, and a set of documents containing the
relevant information for the plant, the surrounding area, and the
results of the various steps of the risk analysis was produced. Nine
independent teams performed an independent review of the QRA,
using their own personal experience, judgment, data, and tools. No
instructions concerning how to perform the peer review process
were given. The results indicate that the participants held widely
varying opinions about all phases of the risk analysis process. Such
issues concerned the acceptability of the method, the quality of the
reporting format, the clarity of assumptions, the adequacy of the
conservativeness in the calculations, and the need for detailed
analysis of catastrophic scenarios. Based on re-analyses and modi-
fications found necessary by the different teams, deviations of up
to 4 orders of magnitude in the different scenarios were obtained.
Conclusions include the need for transparency and an open dia-
logue between the regulator and the operator about the QRA, the
need for common formats for reporting QRA content and results,
and the need for detailed guidance on how to evaluate a risk anal-
ysis from the regulator’s standpoint.
This study indicates that, while independent peer review is seen
as a necessary aspect of the application of QRA in decision making,
see e.g. Apostolakis (2004), peer review suffers from similar prob-
lems as QRA itself, in particular a low reliability between different
teams. Specific review criteria and guidelines, such as the ones pro-
posed in Section 4.3, may alleviate some of the problems and
reduce variability, but no research has been found to confirm this
hypothesis. A central issue seems to be the way QRA is intended
to be used: if a QRA is applied such that heavy reliance is placed
on the results per se, as e.g. in the Dutch chemical industry (van
Xanten et al., 2013), peer review may not be very effective. If how-
ever QRA is used as part of a dialogue between operators and reg-
ulators, as suggested e.g. by Marks (2007), Fabbri and Contini
(2009) and Goerlandt and Montewka (2015), reviews may have
more relevance as part of a process substantiating this dialogue.
The method for quality assurance proposed by Rouhiainen
(1992) has been tested repeatedly, as reported in Rouhiainen
(1993, 1992) and Tuominen and Rouhiainen (1996). Tests included
the reliability of application of the method by different persons,afety-related quantitative risk analysis: A review. Safety Sci. (2016), http://
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cies already identified earlier through comparison with incident
and accident records. The results revealed that the assessors were
able to identify the most significant deficiencies in the QRAs pre-
sented to them. While there was some variation in the deficiencies
detected by test persons with different backgrounds and knowl-
edge, the most significant ones were all identified. Typical deficien-
cies identified by the methods included: the lack of consideration
of the importance of assumptions and of limitations of the hazard
identification methods, the unsystematic and insufficiently
detailed documentation, and the lack of examination of hazards
caused by common cause failures and human error. This suggests
that quality assurance can improve the quality of QRA. However,
several limitations of the quality assurance method were identified
as well: the method is not able to confirm that all relevant hazards
and accident scenarios have been identified and appropriately
addressed, it cannot reveal omissions and mistakes in calculations,
and its application is subjective, both in terms of the aspects of
concern and the importance of the identified deficiencies.
The maturity model by Rae et al. (2014) has not been exten-
sively tested, but some initial confirmation has been achieved.
Completeness, i.e. whether the model covers all types of errors
made in risk analyses, has been tested based on the academic liter-
ature, published peer reviews of QRA and the authors’ experience.
While full completeness is not claimed, the evaluation indicates a
good coverage of the model. Realism, i.e. whether the errors
described in the maturity model are actually found in real QRA
applications, is tested based on an application of the maturity
model to a set of published peer reviews. Good agreement is found,
indicating that the model is realistic. Finally, the appropriateness of
the model, i.e. whether the lower levels of QRA maturity indeed
correspond to more serious flaws, is argued for by the authors.
While many QRA reviews detect flaws on various levels of the
maturity model, the authors argue that such a categorization helps
to focus efforts in the review and when making improvements in
the analysis.
In sum, quality assurance has been found effective to reduce the
number of deficiencies in QRA studies, while it has some inherent
limitations with respect to how effective it can be. Importantly, the
quality assurance rests on the hypothesis that a better process to
produce a QRA leads to a better QRA. While based on the available
evidence, this seems justified, it does not follow that this also nec-
essarily improves decision making based on QRA, or that its appli-
cation actually leads to safer designs. This leads to the question of
the appropriateness of the different claims made about QRA:
6.2. Evidence for claims made about QRA
The empirical contributions of Section 4, while overall rather
limited in number, are useful as a basis for discussing the claims
made about QRA. The discussion made below builds on findings
by Rae et al. (2014), complementing and extending these on some
key points.
6.2.1. Accuracy claim
As noted by Rae et al. (2014), a key question in addressing the
accuracy claim is how accurate the numbers need to be to support
decision making. Referring also to Aven and Heide (2009), to sev-
eral examples of case studies applying risk acceptance criteria,
and to risk characterisations applying a mean probability value
and confidence intervals, they argue that the required confidence
interval is context-dependent. The way QRA is used defines this
context: in case a QRA is used to justify that the system risk is
lower than a predefined target level, the total error must be less
than the margin between the estimated risk and the risk limit. A
similar reasoning can be applied e.g. when the results of a QRAPlease cite this article in press as: Goerlandt, F., et al. Validity and validation of s
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2016.08.023are expressed in an expected dose format, when maximum dose
levels are predetermined.
Empirically determining the accuracy of a QRA is impossible:
‘‘one of the most powerful methods of science – experimental
observations – is inapplicable to the estimation of overall risk”
(Weinberg, 1981). A prerequisite for accuracy is reliability: the
condition that upon repeated measurement, the results are ‘simi-
lar’. Reliability is a matter of degree, as clear for instance from
the reliability criteria proposed by Aven and Heide (2009), see also
Section 4.1. Unreliable methods place an upper bound to the mea-
surement accuracy. However, the reverse is not true: even per-
fectly reliable measurement may be invalid, if consistently the
wrong results are obtained (Trochim and Donnely, 2008). Thus,
benchmark and reliability studies can rebut, but not confirm the
accuracy claim (Rae et al., 2014).
The benchmark exercises described in Section 4.1 all show con-
siderable variation in the outcomes of the QRA studies: numerical
differences of two to three orders of magnitude are not uncommon,
and also rankings between different scenarios (a considerably
lower requirement in measurement-theoretic terms), often
showed large differences. The inherent variability found also in
hazard identification techniques, an essential building block for
QRA, adds to the unreliable nature of QRA. These benchmark exer-
cises thus confirm the theoretical discussion on the unreliability of
QRA, by Aven and Heide (2009), and provide strong evidence that
the accuracy claim is false.
In practical terms, it is of course possible to limit the variability
of outcomes by mandating the use of a particular QRA tool, as e.g.
done in the Dutch chemical industry (van Xanten et al., 2013), but
this does not mean the resulting numbers are more accurate in
principle. It may lead to more comparable results between instal-
lations, but the uncertainty about the produced numbers, the dom-
inant scenarios, and the relative importance of contributing factors
remains. Based on the lack of proof for the accuracy claim, prac-
tices based on strict comparison of the QRA output with predefined
acceptance criteria, such as described by van Xanten et al. (2013),
seem untenable.6.2.2. Cost-effective usefulness and usefulness claims
The cost-effective usefulness claim requires that using QRA has
benefits in terms of system safety, or in terms of improved consen-
sus building in decision making, which outweigh its costs (Rae
et al., 2014). It is plausible that awareness of the ways in which a
system can fail, knowledge of the dominant scenarios to defend
the system against, the factors contributing to failures, the relative
importance of different accident types, and more generally the
safety information produced by performing a QRA, does provide
a benefit to the management of risks. Quantification could assist
this process, even if the numbers per se are not accurate. Alterna-
tive views of QRA, as processes to broadly describe uncertainties,
including a wide assessment of the strength of evidence for pro-
ducing risk statements and broad intersubjective assessments of
‘black swans’ (Aven, 2008; Paté-Cornell, 2012), may be plausible
methods to support decision making and improving the system
safety. Also e.g. other more modern approaches such as dynamic
risk analysis, where the risk picture is dynamically updated in light
of new information, can provide a path to more cost-effective uses
of risk analysis as a tool supporting decision-making. We refer to
Villa et al. (2016) for a recent review of such approaches.
Scientifically proving this however is not straightforward, espe-
cially when absolute measurements of safety are absent, and
because controlled experiments on real-world applications are
practically infeasible. The authors concur with the view of Rae
et al. (2014) that ‘‘it is the responsibility of those making claims
of usefulness to provide mechanisms for measuring those claims”.afety-related quantitative risk analysis: A review. Safety Sci. (2016), http://
12 F. Goerlandt et al. / Safety Science xxx (2016) xxx–xxxGiven the wide variety of uses suggested for QRA, which do not
rely on the accuracy claim per se, answering this question would
require such mechanisms to confirm this for each stated purpose.
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, no such systematic mecha-
nisms have been proposed to date, and neither have cost-
effectiveness usefulness tests been made. The claim is thus neither
proven nor refuted, while it likely is the highest achievable claim to
be made about QRA, given the proof against the accuracy claim. For
strengthening the foundations of risk analysis, as suggested by
Aven and Zio (2014), developing, testing and applying such mech-
anisms should be considered important themes of fundamental
risk research.
The authors at this point find it necessary to state our beliefs
about QRA, as the above discussion may lead a reader to believe
we oppose the technique. Again, we concur with Rae et al.
(2014), in believing that QRA, adequately performed, probably
does help people to design safer systems. We also believe QRA
can help making good decisions. We however share the need for
a sceptical attitude towards the validity of particular instances of
QRA, and share the view that scientific confirmation of these
claims would help to overcome doubts and criticisms about its
efficacy.
Some credibility concerning the usefulness claim can be derived
from occasional reports of successful application of QRA. For
instance, Merrick et al. (2002) describe the Prince William Sound
Risk Assessment, a quantitative risk analysis to assess the risk of
oil spill in the waterway, in the wake of the Exxon Valdez ground-
ing and oil spill, which had significant economic, ecological and
socio-cultural effects (Herbst et al., 1996; Miraglia, 2002;
Peterson, 2001). The analysis was performed as a collaborative
research effort, where the analysis was the result of an analytic-
deliberative process as described in NRC (1996). While the analysis
did result in probabilistic statements about the relative importance
of accident types in different locations, and included an analysis of
the effect of risk interventions on the system safety, the main per-
ceived value lays in the process of the analysis. Whereas the differ-
ent stakeholder groups did not trust one another at the outset, the
collaborative nature of the analysis fostered a cooperative risk
management atmosphere among all stakeholders. Finally, all
stakeholders accepted the results of the analysis as a basis for
action, and a new ocean rescue tug vessel was deployed as a result.
While this success story does not ‘prove’ that the system safety is
indeed improved as resulting from the analysis, nor that the efforts
were cost-effective, it does show that QRA can be useful, if only to
facilitate consensus building for decision making. It is interesting
to note also that the analysis results were accepted and acted upon,
despite an independent review by NRC (1998) showing some defi-
ciencies according to the criteria given in Section 4.3. The reasons
for this are however unclear to the authors.
It is also worth noting that there are other types of criticism to
QRA, which potentially put limitations on its usefulness to increase
system safety effectively. This especially relates conflicting theo-
ries about the genesis of accidents in complex systems, with sev-
eral accident theories challenging the appropriateness of linear
accident causation models and related accident scenarios to under-
stand failure processes and design countermeasures to improve
safety. As QRA models typically apply linear or complex linear
methods, such as fault trees, event trees, or Bayesian networks,
the appropriateness of QRA for complex systems has been ques-
tioned by several authors (Hagmann, 2012; Hänninen, 2014;
Leveson, 2012). Another challenge to applying QRA to complex sys-
tem risk is the risk homeostasis theory, which suggests that addi-
tional safety measures can be attenuated by humans adapting their
behaviour to keep a perceived level of risk constant (Wilde, 1998).
Other theoretical difficulties with risk in complex systems are that
risks have long incubation periods and migrate, i.e. addressing onePlease cite this article in press as: Goerlandt, F., et al. Validity and validation of s
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2016.08.023risk may create another elsewhere in the system (Grabowski et al.,
2000). It should however be noted that these theories are not con-
clusively proven themselves, adding to the complexity of the dis-
cussion (Pless, 2003; Rae, 2015). Therefore, establishing the
validity of QRA also involves strengthening the evidence for or
against the existing accident theories; another foundational issue
in risk research (Aven and Zio, 2014).
7. Conclusion
In this paper, a review was made concerning the validity and
validation of QRA, based on the scientific literature in key journals
related to risk and safety. First, theoretical views on validity and
validation were reviewed, showing the importance of a realist or
constructivist foundation when performing and validating a risk
analysis. The pragmatic validity of QRA was addressed in relation
to different methods for establishing validity: benchmark exer-
cises, reality checks, procedures for independent peer review and
quality assurance. Each of these approaches were found to bring
valuable insights into the validity of a particular QRA. However,
more research is needed for instance with respect to the effective-
ness of the proposed methods for the different identified uses of
QRA, and which processes, techniques and social structures sup-
port their successful application. Finally, the review was used to
discuss the claims made about QRA in relation to the available evi-
dence. Rejecting the claim that accurate risk estimation is possible,
the cost-effective usefulness claim seems plausible, but very little
evidence for this claim has been found. This is therefore seen as
another important area of future research.
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